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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
HERBERT BURTON, and FLORENCE BURTON,
his wife,
Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.

Sup* Ct. No,

ALAN H. COOMBS, CARLA H. COOMBS, his
wife , FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., a
Utah corporation and FOUR SEASONS MOTOR
INN :II, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

14245

)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

This case is one wherein the Plaintiffs, HERBERT BURTON
and FLORENCE BURTON, his wife, are seeking a money Judgment against
Defendants, ALAN H. COOMBS, CARLA.H. COOMBS, his wife, FOUR SEASONS
MOTOR INN,, INC., a Utah corporation, and FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN II,
INC., a Utah corporation, as a result of an alleged breach of a
management contract for the management of a motel complex in St.
George, Utah, known as FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC.

The Defendant,

FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC. seeks a money judgment against Plaintiffs
on its Counterclaim on the basis of an alleged breach of the responsibilities imposed on the Plaintiffs to manage under the terms of said
management contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, sitting without a jury, entered Judgment
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in favor of Defendants, ALAN H. COOMBS, CARLA H. COOMBS, his wife,

j

FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, II, INC., of no cause of action against each
of said Defendants on the Plaintiffs1 Complaint, granted Judgment in
the amount of $21,333.00 principal, together with interest of $1,050.C
together with attorneys' fees in the amount of $10,000.00, for a totaJJ
Judgment of $32,383.00 in favor of the Plaintiffs and against Defendarj
FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., a Utah corporation, and the trial court
denied the relief sought by the Defendants and each of them on their
Counterclaim.

1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

I

Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment awarded in favor
of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN,
INC., or in the alternative that the case be remanded to the

|

trial court for a new trial. Appellant bases the request for reversal
or remand on the grounds that the court erred as follows:
1.

In finding that the Defendant breached the original

management agreement;
2.

•

The trial court erred in failing to find Plaintiffs

in breach of the original management agreement;
3«

The trial court erred in assessing damages against

Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC. as follows:
(a)

There is no basis for the assessment of

damages against this Defendant, as there is no

1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

basis in fact or law for determining a breach of
contract;
(b)

The amount of damages assessed are excessive

and no basis for the amount of Judgment entered
by the court can be established from the facts or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

evidence,
4.

The finding by the trial court that the management

agreement was a binding and effective contract between the Plaintiffs
and the Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., was in error in that
it was beyond the scope of the evidence, outside the scope of the
pleadings and contrary to the request of any party to the action and
not supported by the facts and evidence in the case*
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In November, 1971, Defendant, ALAN H. COOMBS, began construction on a forty (40) unit motel in St. George, Utah.

In

February of 1972, Defendant COOMBS formed a corporation known as
FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN.

On or about February 24, the corporation

entered into an agreement with Plaintiffs, HERBERT and FLORENCE BURTON,
wherein they agreed to purchase twenty per cent of the corporation
stock for $80,000.00.

In addition, said agreement provided (1) that

BURTONS would be given a Management Contract, whereby they could have
the right to manage the forty unit motel; and (2) that BURTONS would
have first option to invest in a second motel which was contemplated
to be built directly across the street, with the same name.

The terms

of the Management Agreement provided that if the BURTONS ever decided
to cease managing or if for cause, the corporation terminated their
Management Agreement, the BURTONS could sell their Management Contract
to a third party.
(The Court should note at this time that there is no
issue raised as to the saleability or value of BURTON'S
stock and Management Contract.

Plaintiffs did not present

ary testimony that the value of their purchase was worthless
Digitized
by the Howard W. defrauded
Hunter Law Library, J.them
Reuben Clark
School,way.
BYU.
or that
Defendant
inLawany
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In fact,

Plaintiff testified the value had increased from $80,000.00 !
to $125,000.00 (Tr. 90 and 92).

Defendant also was willing !

to give BURTONS their $80,000.00 back, plus an additional
$10,000.00, (Tr. 30, FLORENCE BURTON; Tr. 98 and 113 COOMBS),
j

if they were unsatisfied with the agreement.

J

The Court should also note that Defendant is not
claiming that BURTONS should be deprived of their twenty per
cent interest in the corporation because of their default.
If the Court should find that BURTONS breached the Management Contract, only the Management Contract is affected.)
BURTONS began their employment as Managers in May of 1972, ai
a harmonious relationship existed between the parties for most of the
following year.

In November of 1973, COOMBS started construction on

a second motel directly across the street on the North side, which
was twice the size of the South side motel and which contained a
Convention Center, restaurants, beauty shop and lounge.

I

BURTONS were

given the first option to purchase the Management rights to the larger
motel, but declined to do so. Before the first motel was open,
BURTONS and COOMBS agreed to call the second motel by the same name
as the first motel in order to capitalize on advertising and so that
the first motel could be associated with the Convention Center and
restaurants.
A new corporation was formed under the name FOUR SEASONS
MOTOR INN II, INC., and a twenty per cent interest and Management
Contract was sold to Mr. Derrill Larkin for $160,000.00.

It was the

intent of FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN II, INC
and the BURTONS to operate the two motels separately even though the
motels would have the same name and FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN I would be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MOTOR INN, II, INC. with the Convention Center and related facilities
on the North side of the street.

However, the parties entered into

negotiations to determine if there would not be a mutual advantage to
combining the two motels under one management agreement with the
Plaintiffs as the Managers of the motels and Mr. Larkin, the General
Manager for the Convention Center.

The advantages to such an

arrangement were discussed and included the following:
L

A reduction of responsibility for the BURTONS to allow

for eight hour shifts and General Management and sepervision
responsibilities, rather than a twenty-four hour responsibility then imposed by the original Management Agreement
for the operation of the motel on the South side.
2.

v

*

An increase in salary to the BURTONS with a guaranteed

$1,500.00 per month.
3.

^

*

~

The association of the smaller forty-unit motel on the

South side with the larger motel and related facilities such
as restaurant and Convention Center on the North side for a
savings in advertising and related costs effected by the
joint operation and thereby reducing the per-unit cost for
such items.
Negotiations continued until the new motel was opened.

At

the insistence of Mrs. BURTON, Mr. COOMBS moved the telephone system
to the larger unit motel to establish a central telephone system. Mrs.
BURTON worked with the accountants to develop an accounting method for
the joint operation.

The BURTONS cooperated with COOMBS and other

employees of FOUR SEASONS I and FOUR SEASONS II in establishing the
combined management of the two motels.

The parties coordinated their

effort under the
apparent assumption that a new contract between the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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BURTONS and the corporation had been, or eventually would be, agreed I
upon.

When the new motel was completed, the BURTONS assumed the

management of the combined operation and acted as Managers from

j
J

April 6, 1973, to April 27, 1973.
On April 27, 1973, Mrs, BURTON was visibly and audibly complaining to the other employees.

(Tr. P. 47, BURTON; Tr. 94 COOMBS) 1

The complaint of Mrs. BURTON was relative to the status of the new

1

contract for the management of the two motels under one Management

I

operation.

I

Mr. COOMBS approached Mrs. BURTON in the presence of

the other employees and said, "Florence, we can't have this dissentioj
in the lobby or in the office where customers and other employees
are being affected - please go across the street and Derrill (Mr.
Larkin, the owner of twenty per cent of the North side motel) and
I will come over and talk and we will get this matter settled."

1

(Tr. 94, COOMBS)

|

Mrs. BURTON left to go to her apartment, which is located
in the South side motel.

Later, during the afternoon of the same

I

day, Mr. COOMBS and Mr. Larkin went to the BURTONS1 apartment to

I

find the reasons why Mrs. BURTON was so upset and to see if they

I

could not convince the BURTONS that they should continue as Managers.
Mr. COOMBS began by asking, "What is the problem?

What is it going

to take to make you happy and to get this thing settled so you can
go back to work and feel good about it?" (Tr. 95, COOMBS)(Tr. 28, line
29, BURTON) (Tr. 101, lines 9 through 11, LARKIN).

This was a meetinc

held to explore alternative offers and to encourage the BURTONS to
continue to act as Managers.

There is conflicting testimony as to

the terms Defendant offered BURTONS to induce them to stay, but all
the testimony of all of the witnesses indicates that there were offers
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
made back andDigitized
forth
toMachine-generated
induce the
BURTONS
The BURTONS would
OCR, may
contain errors. to stay.

not agree to any of the terms offered by Defendant and refused to
continue acting as Managers unless the corporation met their demands
for more money.

Before the meeting terminated, the parties agreed

to hold a meeting the next day, in an effort to reach an agreement
satisfactory to all parties*
The next day on April 28, BURTONS and COOMBS met again in
the BURTONS1 apartment, Mr. COOMBS testified that he stated at that
meeting that .if the BURTONS would come back and manage the motels,
he would agree to an increase in their salary from $1,500.00 to
$1,800.00 per month and also that Florence would not have to work.,
(Tr. 97, COOMBS).

Mr. BURTON confirmed that the meeting was held for

the purpose of working out "an equitable solution to the problem . . .
there were offers made back and forth." (Tr. 72, BURTON)

Mr. BURTON'S

final demand was that if they continued in the joint operation management, that the BURTONS would require seven and one-half per cent of
the total gross receipts. Mr. COOMBS indicated that this was excessive.
The anticipated gross receipts would result in a monthly salary to the
BURTONS of between $3,500.00 and $4,000.00.
Mr. COOMBS stated that he "couldn't obligate the motel to
that kind of an obligation . . . let's just move you across the street.
Would you then just come back and manage across the street?" (Tr. 98,
lines 1 through 6, COOMBS) "I told them I would move the telephone
system at my expense across the street (back to the South side) and
that Mr. Larkin would continue to manage the eighty units and you
continue to manage your forty units." (Tr. 98, lines 18 through 20,
COOMBS) "I said, Okay, then, I will repeat this once more, will you
not manage your forty-unit motel?" (Tr. 98, COOMBS)
BURTONS refused to return to the joint operation unless they
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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operation.

They would not return to managing the forty-unit motel,

unless the name was changed on the new North side eighty-unit motel, j
Mr. COOMBS then offered to pay the BURTONS $90,000.00 for their

j

interest and the BURTONS refused, asking $120,000.00. (Tr. 99, COOMBS)
The meeting ended with BURTONS agreeing to exercise the
clause in their Management Agreement wherein they would offer their
interest for sale to a third party if they every wanted to cease
acting as Managers.

On May 1

j

a listing agreement was signed with a

Salt Lake Real Estate firm offering the BURTONS• interest in the fort}
unit motel for sale for $125,000.00. (Tr. 50-51, BURTON)

I

At the request of Mr. COOMBS, a meeting was arranged between!
Mr. COOMBS, Mr. Stewart Poelman, attorney for FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, I
INC., the Plaintiffs and their attorney, David E. West, Esq.

At the j

meeting Mr. COOMBS made the BURTONS four offers (Tr. 112-113, COOMBS).
1.

Offer - work as Managers of the combined

J

operation for a base salary of $1,800.00 or four and onehalf per cent of the gross (which would actually have netted
BURTONS $2,250.00 per month, estimated.)

I

BURTONS' Reply - Offer rejected.

I

2.

Offer - Will you work as Managers of the

I

forty-unit motel under the original contract signed in

I

February, 1973?

I

BURTONS f Reply -

BURTONS indicated that they

|

would return to work as Managers of the forty-unit motel
under the original contract only on three conditions:

I

(a)

That COOMBS changes the name of the new motel;

(b)

That COOMBS pay BURTONS' attorney $10,000.00;

(c)

That COOMBS resign as President of FOUR SEASOK

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3.

Offer - Will you take $90,000.00 for your

interest?

*-•

.,

*-,

BURTONS1 Reply - No, it is worth $120,000,00 ,
(Tr. 129, COOMBS)
4,
for sale?

i

Offer - Will you agree to place the property

If you agree to sell the entire motel and/or

the corporation to a third party, I would agree to give
BURTONS twenty per cent of the profit or $80,000.00, whichever was greater.
BURTONS' Reply - Refused (Tr. 129, COOMBS)
All offers were rejected and refused by the BURTONS and they
thereafter refused to perform as Managers under the joint operation or
the original Management Contract for the operation of the South side
motel.
BURTONS filed this action, claiming Defendants breached the
original Management Contract of February, 1972.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN DEFAULT
OF THE ORIGINAL MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT. 4
A. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR A FINDING OF FACT BY THE TRIAL
JUDGE THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT APPELLANT BREACHED THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT.
Paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact entered by the Court
provides as follows:
"Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., has
breached its agreement with Plaintiffs by making it effectively impossible for them to continue to perform under
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
their Management
Contract.
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This would actually appear to be a Conclusion of Law rather
than a Finding of Fact.

The trial court having refused the request
\

of Defendant that the trial court set forth the actual elements and
facts upon which the trial court relied in making the determination
of breach.

The trial court failed to state in written Findings of

Fact one single Finding to support the conclusions of breach.

"j

Conse-I

quently, this court must look to the transcript of record and the
memorandum decision of court in addition to the actual written Findinc
of Fact to determine what acts the Defendant committed that would

I

constitute a breach of contract.

J

In the transcript of record there appears to be three statements upon which the trial court must have relied on in concluding th«
the Management Contract was beached by the Defendant.

We respectfully

submit that the evidence does not constitute a basis in law or fact
upon which the trial court could have made such a conclusion and
requests this court to examine said Findings and compare the same to
the information set forth in the transcript of record.
It would appear that the statement hereinafter set forth
is the primary basis for the trial court's decision/ since the language used in the court's written Conclusions is very similar to that
used in this statement (In Court proceeding February 10, Tr. 8,
Lines 18-22)". . . That FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., through Alan
i

Coombs, its principal officer and moving agent, moved the effective
management of the South side of the operation across the street to
the North side in violation of the paragraph 1 under grant of management rights and duties which granted to the BURTONS the sole and
exclusive right to operate and manage the FOUR SEASONS MOTEL on the
property described in the exhibit." (South side motel)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It would appear that this statement in the transcript of
the Judge's decision on February 10, 1975, is the basis for the
alleged breach of contract.

The language found in the Conclusions

is similar to that used in this statement.

However, a close reading

of the same transcript four pages earlier (Page 4) reveals that this
could not constitute a breach because the BURTONS cooperated in the
move.

On page 4 the Court made the exact opposite finding to the

above statement on page 8. (Tr. 4, Line 9.-19, Court proceeding) "The
court further finds that the Plaintiffs knew or reasonably should
have known that the Defendant intended to build a motel across the
street; that they knew about it, were advised of it, had an opportunity to invest and participate in the construction; that they
declined, that they agreed either tacitly or factually to the construction of the motel across the street; that they went over there
voluntarily and entered into a working agreement with the Defendant."
(emphasis added)
(Tr.5, Lines 203, Court proceedings) "The Court finds that
shortly thereafter and while the (Burtons) were in operation of and
managing the units, both the one that they were originally investors
in and the one across the street, that the relationship broke down.
The court doesn't find either party in default of the contract before
that point."

(emphasis added)

The breakdown occurred after the parties had voluntarily
cooperated to move the offices to the North side in anticipation of
managing the two motels jointly.

Therefore, the court didn't find

either party in default in moving the effective management of the
South side across the street to the North side.
The finding set forth by the court on pages 4 and 5 clearly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There is no written finding of fact indicating which of the contradicting statements that the court ultimately takes as true.

We cannot

readily assume that the court did intend to base its conclusion of

.j

breach by the Defendant by this act, (i.e., of moving the operating .!
facilities from the South side to the North side).

Furthermore, the •
I
trial court's finding that neither party was in default in moving
]
the operating facilities from the South side to the North side was
fully supported by the evidence and testimony at the trial.

Neither

the Plaintiff or the Defendant presented any evidence, testimony or
claim that would suggest the BURTONS did not approve, support and
assist in the moving of the operating facilities to the North side.

Since the Court found no fault with either party in the
moving of the office to the North side, then what act did the Defendant commit that breached the Management Contract?

We ask this

court to turn its attention to page 5 of the transcript of court
proceedings.
" . . . they were ordered back to their side of the
street. That is a breach of the original agreement
between the parties."
(Tr. 5, Lines 16-17, Court)
It is inconceivable that the trial court could consider
this act by the Defendant COOMBS to constitute the act which made it
"effectively impossible" for the BURTONS to perform their Management
Contract.

The original Management Agreement was to manage a forty-

unit motel on the South side, wherein Plaintiff BURTON resided.
When Mr. COOMBS "ordered" Mrs. BURTON back to the forty-unit motel
across the street, he was, in fact, telling her to go to the side
where she had
a Management Contract. The only way he would be in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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breach was to have ordered her not to go across the street.

There

is absolutely no evidence that Mr. COOMBS denied the BURTONS' access
to the motel in which they had a Management Contract, but rather the
BURTONS were merely asked to leave the North side in which they had
no interest.

The ordering of Mrs. BURTON to go across the street

could only constitute a termination of the combined

Management

Agreement, an agreement which was never fully concluded.

The court

should also note that only Mrs. BURTON was asked to leave the North
side lobby, and neither Mr. or Mrs. BURTON interpreted Mr. COOMBS'
act as an intent to terminate their employment.

**

The true purpose of asking Mrs. BURTON to leave the North
lobby was to relieve a situation which was disturbing normal business
practices, and to give Mrs. BURTON time to cool off.

The actions of

the parties after the "order" to go across the street are probative
in demonstrating that Mr. COOMBS' action could not be grounds for
breach of contract, since there was no termination intended by COOMBS
and no termination interpreted by the BURTONS. We would first ask
the court to read Mr. COOMBS' testimony regarding his alleged ordering
of Mrs. BURTON across the street.

(Tr. 94, Lines 1-11, 20-25, COOMBS)

Mrs. BURTON confirmed Mr. COOMBS' testimony that she was upsetting
the help, (Tr. 46, Lines 1-5 BURTON) and visibly unhappy.
Lines 27-28, BURTON)

(Tr. 28,

Mrs. BURTON did in fact go across the street

and Mr. COOMBS and Mr. Larkin followed shortly thereafter.

Mr. BURTON

could not attend the full meeting because he was still working on the
North side.

(Tr. 29, Lines 26-28, BURTON)

The testimony of Mrs.

BURTON when Mr. COOMBS came across the street is as follows:
(Tr. 28, Lines 29-30, BURTON) "The first words Alan said was, "What
does it take to make you happy?" Mr. Larkin testifies to a similar
by the Howard(Tr.
W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark LawLarkin)
School, BYU. "Mr. COOMBS
statement by Mr.Digitized
Coombs:
161,
Line
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opened by saying, "We see you have a problem, what can we do to
work it out?"

Mr. COOMBS testified that he stated as follows:

(Tr, 95, Lines 15-18, COOMBS) "What is the problem, what is it going
to take to make you happy and get this thing settled so you can go
back to work and feel good about it?"
A discussion then followed wherein various offers and
counter-offers were explored, (Tr. 95 and 96, COOMBS)

i

It is clear that these statements do not carry any threat
of termination nor did BURTONS consider themselves terminated.
BURTON was still working and performing managerial duties.

Mr.

Mr. COOMBS

did not tell them to "get out of the South side" or "yourfre fired
from your management contract".

He was there to solve the problem.

According to Mrs. BURTON, he asked them, "What would it take to make
you happy?"

Mr. COOMBS wanted them back working.

He was proposing

terms, compromising, asking them to come back to work.
of their employment was not even considered.

Termination

It was just a matter

of coming to terms so that the relationship would continue.
The court should note that the negotiations at the
April 28th meeting were attempts to induce BURTONS to manage
the combined motels.

The next day, however, on April 29th, another

meeting was held between the parties and at this meeting, Mr. COOMBS
offered to move the telephone switchboard back to the old office
where the BURTONS could operate the forty-unit motel under the
original Management Agreement.

(Tr. 98, Lines 1-6, 19-21 COOMBS)

We invite the court to read the testimony given by Mr. COOMBS
(Tr. 96-97, COOMBS) Mr. BURTON (Tr. 71, BURTON) and Mrs. BURTON
(Tir, 30, BURTON) to determine for themselves that at this meeting
on April 29th there was no suggestion by Mr. COOMBS that the original
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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solely to induce the BURTONS to continue as managers either on
the North side as Managers of both units, or the South side, under
the original agreement.

*

Was there any evidence presented by the BURTONS which
would indicate COOMBS made it "effectively impossible" for them
to manage the South side?

Only one paragraph on page 104, BURTON

states that the office equipment, including the telephone was moved
to the North side.

(The discussion on Point I already shows that

they cooperated in this move.) BURTON further states on Line 30 .
that on June 12, a wooden stake and neon sign was placed which said
"Office across the street".

But the court should not fail to note

that this was placed a month after the May 14 meeting when BURTONS
had already rejected COOMBS1 proposal that he move the telephone switchboard back to the South side and re-establish the office there. •;. \
Coombs did everything "effectively possible" to induce BURTONS
back to the original Management Agreement and BURTONS refused.

We

challenge the court to find any testimony presented by Plaintiff
that would support a finding that Defendant made it effectively
impossible for BURTONS to continue to perform the Management Agreement.
In fact, the BURTONS refused to perform the original
Management Agreement because they wanted to sue COOMBS for damages
over the full life of the contract . (Tr. 75, Line 18)

BURTONS didn't

want to work. (Tr. 72, Lines 13-3- and Tr. 99, Lines 17-24) and
that they could get over $200,000.00 without ever working again.
(Tr, 127, Line 26-29).

COOMBS offered to let them work but their

trial strategy was already planned.
If the act of ordering Mrs. BURTON across the street was
in fact the breaching act, we find that the trial court has gone
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cannot be supported in law or fact*
,

The question still remains, "What act did the Defendant

commit which constituted the breach?"
We now ask the court to focus on the time period of
April 29th until May 14th,

It is in this time period that the

breach would have had to occur since it is obvious that neither
the act of moving the office to the North side nor the act of
asking Mrs, BURTON to leave the North side could be the breaching act
It is concerning this time period that the trial court made the
following finding:
*•••- •< ,
<

"Any offer of re-employment made by Defendant,
Alan H. Coombs acting for the Defendant, Four Seasons
Motor Inn, Inc., was conditioned upon the Plaintiffs1
operating the motel under an addendum agreement to which
the Plaintiffs had not agreed.

•^ , (Supplemental Findings)
We again implore the court to consider this ruling in
light of the transcript of the record.

This finding completely
i

ignores the unrebutted testimony of Mr. COOMBS.

!

Mr. COOMBS testified that he returned to the BURTONS1
apartment on April 2 9th.

During this meeting, the various offers

were again discussed in an attempt to induce BURTONS to act as
Managers of the joint operation of the North side.
COOMBS).

All efforts in that regard failed.

(Tr. 96-97,

Mr. COOMBS then

testified that he was willing to move the telephone system back to
the South side if they would just come back and manage their own
forty units. (Tr. 98, Lines 1-6, 18-30, COOMBS)

This was an uncon-

ditional offer to set up a separate office on the South side so that
the BURTONS could perform the original Management Agreement.

Again,

this was an unconditional offer to perform the original Management
Agreement,
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This had nothing to do with an addendum agreement*

M r . COOMBS further testified that on May 1 4 , he made
the same unconditional offer to let BURTONS perform the original
Management Agreement in the presence of M r . West, M r . Burton and
M r . Stuart Poelman. (Tr. 112, Lines 26-28, COOMBS).

M r . Poelman

was then "worn for the purpose of supporting M r . COOMBS' unconditional
offer.

After an objection to the use of M r . Poelman as a witness,

it was agreed that M r . Poelman would not testify on condition that
M r . COOMBS 1 testimony remain unrebutted.

(Tr. 186, Lines 9-13,

POELMAN)

•>:
And, in fact, his testimony was not rebutted by the

••••••••

Plaintiffs even though they had the opportunity to get back on the
witness stand and deny this unconditional offer.
That the fact trier may discount testimony of selfinterested party is undisputed, but there must be some recognition
of the testimony and good reasons why the trial Judge should not
believe the witness.

The general statement of the law on unrebutted

testimony is found in 81 Am.Jr. 2d "Witnesses" § 660, which states
as follows:
"It' is established as a general rule that when a d i s *
interested witness who is in no way discredited by other
evidence, testifies to a fact within the knowledge of
such witness which is not in itself improbably, or in
conflict with other evidence, the witness is to be
believed and particularly where his testimony is fully
corroborated. A like rule has been applied to the
uncontradicted testimony of a party or interested witness."
See also 30 Am.Jur. 2d "Evidence" § 1084, weight of uncontradicted
testimony of interested party.
As a corollary to the above, the principle has been announced
that testimony given by an interested party should not be wholly
disregarded or arbitrarily rejected, but should be accepted as proof
of the issue for Digitized
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or unreasonable, contrary to natural laws, opposed to knowledge or
contradictory within itself.

The Utah Supreme Court discussed this

issue at length in the case of American Scale Mfg. Co, v. Zee, 120
Utah 402, 235 P 2d 361 (1951).

In the Zee case the Plaintiff brought

suit to recover the costs of scales sold to Defendant for $837.90

<
j

down and the balance in monthly installments.

The Defendant refused

to pay the balance and counterclaimed for his downpayment back on the
grounds that Plaintiff's salesman was guilty of fraudulent promises
at the time of sale.

The trial court held that Plaintiff did not mak<

any misrepresentations to the Defendant.
Defendant assigned this finding as error and contended that
the issue of fraud was proven by clear and convincing evidence and
asked for a reversal.

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's

holding and stated in pertinent part as follows:
"We recognize the fact that trial Judge is in a better
position to observe the manner and demeanor and adjudge
the credibility of a witness than we are and we recognize
the law that the trial Judge can disbelieve a witness in
part or entirely under certain circumstances.

j
I
\

"Our specific problem is, however, under what circumstances
can the trial Judge disbelieve the positive and uncontradict
testimony of a witness on a given subject when there is no
other evidence whatever on the same subject.
"The general rule as to the effect of positive uncontradicte*
testimony is found in National Bank of Commerce of N.Y. v.
Bottolfson, 55 S.D 196, 225 N.W. 385, 386, 69 A.L.R.892,
wherein the court said, 'where the testimony of a witness is
uncontradicted and not inherently improbably and there are
no circumstances tending to raise a doubt of its truth, the
facts so proven should be taken as conclusively established
and verdict directed or decision entered accordingly."
The Utah court then went on to discuss the circumstances
when this rule would not be followed and looked at the facts of the
case to determine whether the Zee case would fall within this rule.
The court then stated,
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"After examining the record closely, we cannot find any
circumstances that would raise a doubt as to the truth of
Defendant's testimony. It seems reasonable and consistent
with truth to us. We hold, therefore, that Defendant's
testimony was clear and convincing in support of his
Answer and Counterclaim."
We request the court to examine the record of the case at
bar.

The circumstances surrounding the facts clearly support

Defendant's testimony that he made two unconditional offers to reopen the South side motel lobby.

The testimony of BURTONS and COOMBS

is clear and convincing that COOMBS never intended to terminate the
BURTONS' employment and made many offers to induce them to work.
The defense offered to corroborate the testimony of Mr.
COOMBS by proferring the testimony of Mr. Stuart Poelman regarding
the negotiations and offer of May 14. Counsel for Defendants challenged
the Plaintiffs to rebut the COOMBS testimony, but the Plaintiffs chose
to remain silent.
How can the trial court ignore these offers and find that
any offer of reemployment was conditioned upon Plaintiffs operating
under an Addendum Agreement?

Can the trial Judge disregard COOMBS'

and Poelman's positive and uncontradicted testimony?

We contend that

the rule expressed in the Zee case must be applied in the instant case.
Why did the court ignore the testimony?

We think it is

important to ask this question since it is possible that the trial
Judge missed this testimony altogether.

It is one thing for the trial

Judge to hear testimony, understand it and assess it for the weight
it carries.

However, it is an altogether different problem if the

trial court did not hear the testimony or did not understand the
testimony or mistakenly believed that COOMBS referred to the Addendum
Agreement when he referred to the original Management Agreement.
Four months
passed between the trial on August 14 and the
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issuance of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 4.
The contradictions and vagueness found in the court's transcript is
a strong indication that the complex issues became confused and many
of the facts presented at the trial were undoubtedly forgotten by
the court by the time the court made its decision,

#

We believe the complex nature of the testimony in discussing
the North-side South-side bifurcation and original agreements and the
Addendum Agreement may have created confusion in the Judge's mind and
he did not fully comprehend that COOMBS was referring to the South sic
when he made the unconditional offers to let BURTONS manage under the
original Management Agreement.
The manner in which the trial Judge write his findings
indicates that he was not aware of the unconditional offers made by
COOMBS,

The trial court simply does not acknowledge in his findings

that he was aware of such offers or that he knew of such offers. He
did not chose to disbelieve COOMBS, he simply failed to understand
!

or remember COOMBS1 testimony.

If, in fact, the trial court Judge

'

made his ruling under a mistaken assumption, then the court should
remand the case back to the lower court and require the court to
clarify its position on this critical issue.
Ultimately, though no finding exists on this point, COOMBS1
testimony remains unrebutted.

The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to

deny or otherwise explain the testimony of COOMBS on the unconditional
offer, but declined to do so and the testimony must stand.
Thus, the trial court erred in finding that any offer of
reemployment was conditioned upon Plaintiffs operating the motel under
an Addendum Agreement.

The testimony is clear and unrebutted that

there were offers made to the Plaintiffs by Defendant to establish the
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South side office and allow them to perform according to the original

agreement.

The Defendant has no argument with the trial court's

conclusion that the Plaintiffs were not required to work on the North
side under an Addendum Agreement.

We agree that there is no enforceable

agreement which would require BURTONS to manage the combined units.
However, once it was determined that the parties could not agree
on the terms to a new contract, the BURTONS had the obligation to
accept COOMBS' offer to reinstate the office in the old motel and
to commence performance under the original Management Agreement.
In summary of Point I, it would therefore appear conclusive
that the Findings of Fact entered by the court bear no relationship
to the testimony and evidence and are the result of error and/or
confusion.

Since the Findings were contradictory, incorrect and

unsupported by the testimony, the conclusion of the Court that the
Defendant breached the original Management Agreement is clearly
* *"

wrong.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND PLAINTIFFS IN
BREACH OF THE ORIGINAL MANAGEMENT CONTRACT.
The Management Agreement entered into in February of 1972,
by and between FOUR SEASONS MOTOR, INC., Defendant-Appellant herein,
therein referred to as "Corporation", and HERBERT and FLORENCE BURTON,
defines the responsibilities of each of the parties thereto.

The

agreement provides among other things the following:
GRANT OF MANAGEMENT DUTIES; . . .
Paragraph 2-B "Upon completion of said motel, BURTONS or
their designated assistant shall occupy the Manager's
• '-, quarters and shall devote their best efforts to the management and operation of said motel and the office thereof on
a twenty-four hour daily schedule."
Paragraph
2-C "BURTONS shall have the responsibility to
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orderly condition at all times, in keeping with the
highest standards of maintenance and operation of the
motel and hotel-industry."
The records and evidence in the trial court proceedings
i

show that the BURTONS did undertake and discharge the responsibilities
imposed by the Management Agreement from the time of completion of
the South side motel up to the point in time when they joined in the
discussions and efforts to combine the management responsibilities
on the South side motel with the management responsibilities on the
North side motel.

Reference is made to the narrative as more

particularly set forth in Point I hereinabove set forth as to the
date, time and sequence of these various events.
i

Appellant contends that the following undisputed facts
establish the basis for the breach of the Management contract by the
Plaintiffs:
1.

On February 28, 1973, they left their responsibilities

as Managers of the motel without prior notice thereof and they therei

after repeatedly refused to return.
2.

On Sunday, April 29, 1973, the Plaintiffs told Mr. COOMB

that they would not return to their duties as Managers of the first
motel under the terms of the written Management Agreement, unless the
Defendants were willing to change the name of the second motel, a
condition which was not a responsibility of the corporation under
the terms of the written Management Agreement.
3.

On May 14, 1973, in the offices of David E. West, Esq.,

Plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. COOMBS gave the Plaintiffs the option of
returning to the management of the first motel under the terms of
the original written Management Agreement or of reassuming the
management of the joint operation of both motels under the terms of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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At

that time, the Plaintiffs rejected both proposals, indicating that
they would not return to the management of the first motel unless the
Defendants agreed:
(a)

To change the name of the second motel;

(b)

To have Mr. COOMBS resign as President of

the first corporation; and
(c)

To pay attorneys' fees to the Plaintiffs1

attorneys in the amount of $10,000.00.
Reference is made again to the fact that this testimony was
presented to the trial court and was uncontroverted by Plaintiffs.
4.

By letter dated April 2, 1974, Mr. COOMBS in behalf of

the FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC. - Appellant, again tendered the
unconditional offer to the Plaintiffs to return to the management of
the first motel under the terms of the written Management Agreement.
Plaintiffs rejected said tender by letter from their counsel to
counsel for Defendants, dated April 12, 1974, and indicated that they
did not intend to return to the management of the motel, but rather,
stated,

We intend to stand on our claim for damages
5.

(Tr• f|3f€»6*«b3V

Both Plaintiffs testified during the first day of trial

that they could not return to their duties as Managers of the motel.
These statements were clear, unequivocal and unconditional.
A contract may be breached either by a simple non-performance
of essential conditions of the contract or by an advance repudiation
of the"contract which constitutes a present total breach of a contract
to be performed in the future or over a period of time.
are guilty of both types of breach.

Plaintiffs

Their breach by non-performance

is clear by their failure to perform their management duties and
their repudiation of the contract is made clear by each of the rest
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of their actions as -ine+- annn.«%.^*.-j

The acts of the Plaintiffs and the lawful effects thereof
can best be analyzed by first reviewing the law with regard to the
breach of a contract and its consequences.

A clear statement of the

law'is set forth at 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts, Section 448, as follows:
"According to the general view prevailing now in nearly
all American jurisdictions, where there has been an
anticipatory breach of the contract by one party thereto
the other party may treat the entire contract as broken
and may immediately sue for the breach. An anticipatory
breach of contract is one committed before the time has
come when there is a present duty of performance and is the
outcome of words or acts evincing an intention to refuse
performance in the future . . . In many cases, however,
assuming to apply the doctrine of anticipatory breach,
the breach involved is a present breach accompanied by a
repudiation, and the real question involved is whether
the breach is total and whether damages, as for a total
breach, are recoverable.

t-

"In ascertaining whether an anticipatory breach of contract
has been committed by a party, it is the intention manifested by his acts which controls, not his secret intention.
Moreover, in order to predicate a cause of action upon an
anticipatory breach, the words or conduct evidencing the
breach must be unequivocal and positive in nature."
The Utah Supreme Court clearly adopts the doctrine of

anticipatory breach.

Such is reaffirmed in the recent case of

University Club v. Invesco Holding Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 1, 504
P.2d 29 (1972), where the court stated:
"The recognized rule is that where one party definitely
indicates that he cannot or will not perform a condition
of a contract, the other party is not required to uselessly
abide time, but may act upon the breached condition. Indeed, in appropriate circumstances, he ought to do so to
mitigate damages."
Fitting the above declarations of law to the facts of this
case, it is clear that the Plaintiffs engaged in both a present bread
arid an anticipatory breach of their contract, first by leaving work
and failing to ever return and second by their expressed and implied
renunciation
of the contract as a whole. Such a renunciation is
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evidenced by (1) the fact that the Plaintiffs have, since May 1,
1973, maintained a consistent position that they would not return
to the management of the motel; and (2) the Plaintiffs1 clear,
unequivocal and unconditional sworn testimony that they could not
return to the management of the motel; and (3) the Plaintiffs1
requirement that additional terms of the Management Contract be
agreed to by the Defendants before they would perform their management duties.
. The position taken by the Plaintiffs.that they would not
return tottiemanagement of the motel after they left it about May 1,
1973, is demonstrated by the fact that they have not returned.

It

is also demonstrated by the fact that they filed a lawsuit seeking
damages rather than restitution.

The letter signed by Plaintiffs'

counsel, dated April 12, 1974, makes it further clear that the
Plaintiffs did not intend to return to the management of the motel,
but instead were going to stand on their claim for damages.
The Plaintiffs' renunciation of the Management Contract
could not have been more clear or unequivocal than was stated by
the Plaintiffs in their sworn testimony during the first day of trial.
They stated very simply and unconditionally that they could not
return to the management of the motel.

This was not only a

reaffirmation of their prior position, but was in itself a declaration of repudiation.

It was there clearly confirmed that the

Plaintiffs did not want a reinstatement of the contract since they
could not perform it.
The Utah court has also made it clear that whenever a
party insists that the other party perform additional acts or gives
additional concessions beyond the terms of the contract itself before
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the party demanding such concessions will himself perform the
conditions of the contract, such conduct constitutes a repudiation
of the contract.

In the case of Jordan v. Madsen, 69 Utah 112, 252

£.570, 573 (1926), the Utah court stated:
"It, of course, is well settled that a renunciation
or repudiation of a contract by one party before the
time fixed for performance constitutes a breach and
gives an immediate right of action to the adverse party.
5 Page on Contracts, Section 2885; 13 C.J.651. It
also is well settled that if one of the -parties to a
contract notifies the other party that he will not perform
unless such other assents to a material modification of
the contract, or by the addition of new terms, such conduct
amounts to a renunciation of the contract. 5 Page on Contracts, Section 2904* The breach here as alleged operated
as a discharge of the contract, which gave the Plaintiff,
who was not in default, the right to ignore the contract
as a basis of his rights and to sue as he did in quasi
contract to recover reasonable compensation for what he
furnished in partial performance of the contract (5 Page
on Contracts, Section 3023) - here the value of his old
car, alleged to be $900. The renunciation discharged the
Plaintiff from further performance. 5 Page, Section 2883;
13 C.J. 653. (emphasis added)
Thus, the fact that the Plaintiffs both on Sunday, April 29,
1972, and on May 14, 1972, required additional concessions from the
Defendants before they would proceed with their performance of the
Management Agreement constitutes a renunciation of the contract under
the law as stated by the Utah court.
It appears clear that the Plaintiffs not only failed to
perform their contract, but renounced the contract so as to constitute a total breach thereof.
An explanation of the remedies available against a party
who has breached a contract through renunciation is set forth
at 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts, Section 449, as follows:
"Nearly all the courts considering the question have
reached the conclusion that a renunciation or repudiation
of a contract before the time for performance, which
amounts
to
a W.
refusal
to J.perform
itSchool,
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refusal to perform it at any time, gives the
adverse party the option to treat the entire
contract as broken and to sue immediately for damages
as for a total breach. There is. no necessity in such
case for a tender of performance, or compliance with
conditions precedent, or waiting for the time of performance to arrive, although this is optional. If the
injured party does not wish to bring such an immediate
suit for damages, he may elect between two other alternatives - that is, (1) to treat the contract as still
binding and wait until the time arrives for its performance by the promisor, and at such time to bring an action
on the contract; or (2) to rescind the contract and sue for
money paid or the value of services or property furnished.
Also, if the contract is of that general class which equity
will specifically enforce, the injured party may, at his
election, sue for specific performance notwithstanding
that the time has not arrived for complete performance of
the contract. (emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this line of reasoning
in the case of Jordan v. Madsen, supra, when it announced, as quoted
above:

"The breach here as alleged operated as a discharge of the

contract, which gave the Plaintiff, who was not in default, the right
to ignore the contract on a basis of his rights and to sue as he did
in quasi contract to recover reasonable compensation for what he
furnished in partial performance of the contract . . . the renunciation
discharged the Plaintiff from further performance."

252 Pac at 573.

(emphasis added)
It should be noted that the Defendants have appropriately
applied to the court for the alternative remedy of rescission.

In the

Pre-Trial Order, the First Counterclaim asserts:
"Defendant Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc. claims that
Plaintiffs have breached the written Management Agreement
which forms the basis for the First Cause of Action under
the Plaintiffs' claims herein and that because of such
said breach of contract on the part of the Plaintiffs,
Defendants are relieved from any further obligation of
performance under said contract."
Defendants did, at the time of the trial, elect the remedy
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\

the Defendants were relieved from any further obligation of performance under the Management Agreement,

Because the method of operating the motels was substantially j
changed just prior to the Plaintiffs' refusal to workf (this being

I

occasioned by the effort to operate jointly under the proposed

•

addendum agreement), Defendants were not able to furnish the court

j

with a precise calculation of the extent of their damagee

There was I

evidence produced by the Plaintiffs that the apartment which the

i
i

Plaintiffs continued to occupy even while they refused to work had

{

a rental value of about $250.00 per month.

j

There is also evidence

that the corporation stood the costs of utilities used by the

.

Plaintiffs during that period.

l

The Defendants produced evidence

\
I
tional employees to assume the work which the Plaintiffs were supposed
concerning expenses which they had to incur to hire and train addi-

to have been performing and both Mr. COOMBS and Mr. Larkin testified j
concerning the probably loss of business and inefficiencies of
operation which were occasioned by the Plaintiffs' unexpected termin-j
ation of services. Mr. Larkin explained that because of the BURTONS'
non-performance, he was required to assume the motel management even !
l

though he was not qualified to do so, and that by doing so, he was
required to neglect his duties as Manager of the Convention Center

'

and restaurants, which, in his opinion, resulted in a loss of business
and was a significant factor in requiring the sale of the Convention
Center and restaurants at a significant loss.

Based upon such evidenc

the court is in a position to award some or at least nominal damages
to the Defendants as well as their attorneys' fees.
There is ample justification for the award of attorneys'
fees to the Defendants.
^J_

The Management Contract provides for same.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~J. ~4.^v*>, -*+. i^ai-Y^ Q f l i o r ^ n f •

•

H

In the event either party hereto resorts to
legal action in order to enforce the terms hereof,
the defaulting party agrees to pay all costs incurred
in such action, -including a reasonable attorneys1 fee."
Obviously, the Defendants have been put to great costs
and legal expense in this case.

Counsel has been required to

travel to St. George on four different occasions/ to bring witnesses
into court including one who had to travel from Salt Lake City and
counsel has engaged in hundreds of hours in connection with conferences , preparation, research, depositions, trial, etc.

Plaintiffs

did, at the time of trial, stipulate that the reasonable value of
the attorneys1 fees to be awarded was in the sum of $10,000.00.
Defendants respectfully request the court to award said sum as a
part of their judgment against the Plaintiffs.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT,
FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., AS FOLLOWS:
(a)

There is no basis for the assessment of damages

against this Defendant, there is no basis in fact or law for determining a breach of the contract;
Reference is made to the narrative and argument set forth
in Point I hereinabove set forth.

Absent a showing of breach based

upon appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law found in
the evidence, the Court was not justified in assessing damages.
(b)

The amount of damages assessed are excessive and no

basis for the amount of Judgment entered by the Court can be established from the facts or evidence.
The determination by the Court that the Plaintiffs were
entitled to relief in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for each month
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that they were "effectively deprived" of the right to manage the
South side motel is likened to a magician pulling a rabbit out of

I

a hat.

'

The trial court had no basis whatsoever upon which to

predicate the sum of $1,000.00 per month and to award such an amount j
for the period of time awarded by the Court was erroneous both as

I

to the amount and the period of time.

!

i

The evidence was clear and

uncontroverted that the BURTONS were invited to return to the manage-i
ment of the South side motel on April 28, 1973# April 29, 1913,

on

May 14, 1973, and by letter of April 2, 1974.
i

The sum of $1,000.00/ the maximum fixed amount in the

,

management contract, per month, determined by the Court disregards
J

the obligation imposed upon the Plaintiffs to mitigate any such loss
that they would otherwise incur, it being established that the BURTONS
and each of them, refused to seek out and obtain employment.

The

i

evidence showing that a proper mitigation of damage by the Plaintiffs
would have resulted in their having earned more money than they would
likely have been paid under the Management Contract.
In the event, for some reason, this Court were to find from
the record and facts that Defendant, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR, INC., was
responsible in some manner for the breach of the Management Contract,
and that some award of damage should be made to the BURTONS, it is
clear from the record and evidence that the amount awarded by the
court is excessive.

By letter of April 2, 1974, the Plaintiffs were

unconditionally invited to return to the management of the motel on
the South side and to assume and discharge their responsibility as
imposed therein.

No basis whatsoever exists to determine that a

breach of the Management Contract on the part of the Defendant-Appellc
existed from that date forward and the maximum period that the trial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have been from the period A p r i l , 1973, to A p r i l , 1974.

Thereafter,

and assuming for discussion purposes, that the $1,000.00 per month
found by the trial court to be the amount of damages was supported
by the evidence, the Plaintiffs were obligated to mitigate their
damages.

It is noted that the BURTONS were allowed to live in the

apartment at the motel during this period of time, enjoy the use of
utilities and related benefits at no cost to them.

Consequently,

I

the trial court erred in failing to offset the per month amount

I

determined as damages by the benefits received by the BURTONS during

I

the period of alleged breach and by the amount of income that the

I

BURTONS could have reasonably earned from outside and available

I

employment.

I
POINT IV.

I

THE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
WAS A BINDING AND EFFECTIVE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, PLAINTIFFS
AND DEFENDANT, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., WAS IN ERROR IN THAT IT
WAS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE EVIDENCE, OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE
PLEADINGS AND CONTRARY TO THE REQUESTS OF ANY PARTY TO THE ACTION AND
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.
The Plaintiffs were seeking a determination by the trial

(

1

court that the Management Contract was breached and that said

1

Plaintiffs were entitled to damages.

1

The Defendants were seeking a

determination by the court that the Management Contract was breached
and that they, the Defendants were entitled to damages.

No request

1
|f

was made by any party or reserved in the Pre-Trial Order or contended
as an element of relief requested or sought by any party at the end

|

of the trial that the Management Agreement should be considered as

1

being in full force and effect.

The record being replete with indi-

II

If

cations by the Plaintiffs that they could not continue with the

If

Managment Agreement.

I]

The decision of the court to impose upon the parties a
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determination that the Management Agreement was in full force and
effect was in error.

It was beyond the scope of the evidence and

contrary to the desire of any party to the action,
CONCLUSION
Having failed in their proof that the Defendants had
renounced the Management Agreement so as to justify a remedy based
on anticipatory breach, the Plaintiffs are left without any evidence
to sustain a claim of present breach by reason of non-performance.
The most that can be said is that the Defendants refused to pay
compensation to the Plaintiffs during the period they refused to
work.

The Defendants had every right to do so under the law.
Even if Defendants had breached the contract by non-per-

formance, the evidence shows that a proper mitigation of damage by
the Plaintiffs would have resulted in their having earned more money
than they would have likely been paid under the Management Contract.
Thus, they incurred no damage.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs admitted

their design to attempt to enhance rather than mitigate their
damages by refusing to seek or accept other employment until
after the trial. This is sufficient justification for the court to
refuse to award any damages to the Plaintiffs.
On the other hand, much of the same evidence which
want to prove that Defendants had not breached the Management
Contract also provided proof that the Plaintiffs had themselves
breached the contract by refusing to perform, by requiring additional
concessions from the Defendants not contained in the contract and
by outright statements that they would not and could not return to
their Management duties.
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The law supports the Defendants ' claim that the renunciation of the contract by the Plaintiffs entitle them to rescind the
contract.

This the defendants have pleaded in the Pre-Trial Order

and have asserted at trial as their chosen remedy.

In the alternative,

however, Defendants are entitled to a Judgment awarding them damage
in some amount, and, in addition, an award of attorneys1 fees as
provided by the express terms of the Management Agreement and in the
stipulated amount of $10,000.00.
The court should not fail to consider the effect of the
court's granting to the Defendants all that Defendants pray for in
this case.

Such will not deprive the Plaintiffs of their ownership

interest in one of St. George's finest motels.

The Plaintiffs will

continue to possess all of their rights as stockholders, including
their right to receive twenty (20%) per cent of all profits.
Moreover, in connection with such stockholder rights, they will
retain all claims which they may have in connection with their
stockholders derivative suit filed with this Court under Civil
No. 5165.
Defendant-Appellant respectfully prays that this Court I
reverse the decision heretofore entered by the trial court or in
the alternative that the case be remanded back to the District Court
for a new trial.
DATED this

&**"

day of

CJ U^uu

, 1976.

Respectfully Submitted,
CLINE, JACKSON, MAYER & BENSON
<^^

BY1
'<*o tz^^o^
JOSEPH E.'JACKSON, ESQ., of
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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